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Can the U.S. Courts Learn from Failed Terrorist Trials
by Military Commission in Turkey and Peru?
by Ri ch ard Wi l s o n

P

resident George W. Bush signed a military order in November
2001 that provided for trial by military commission for any
person designated by the president as an illegal combatant. All
of the detainees in Guantanamo Ba y, Cuba, along with thre e
U.S. citizens held in Defense De p a rtment custody on the U.S. mainland,
have been so designated. That designation makes military commissions
their only legal redress, if they are to be tried at all. This leaves both the
decision to try them and the stru c t u re and procedure of their trials exc l usively in the hands of the executive branch.
This article examines the controversial issue of trial by military
commission and the convictions of alleged terrorists in Tu rkey and Peru
by such commissions. This ye a r, re v i ewing courts ove rturned these convictions and pre-empted any future death sentences. Both decisions
found that the defendants’ rights to due process and fair trial had been
denied, thus necessitating expensive and prolonged new trials before
legitimate civilian courts. These cases suggest that careful re v i ew by the
j u d i c i a rycan keep excessive actions by the executive branch in check, but
only if the judiciary of the United States is willing to step in to provide
the needed objectivity and dispassionate review of exe c u t i ve decisionmaking.

those procedures the secre t a ry of defense named military lawyers as both
chief prosecutor and chief defense counsel. Soon thereafter, the president
announced that six detainees were eligible for trial by the commissions,
including two British citizens, but no trials have begun as of this writing.
The commission rules include limitations on the right of the accused to
choose their defense counsel, significant interference with the full abilities of defense counsel to prepare and mount an adequate defense,
improper and lower standards of due process for non-citizens, no re v i ew
of decisions of the commissions by independent courts, and the death
penalty as a potential sanction. The provisions for trial by military commission also apply to the three U.S. citizen detainees. It seems that the
government can invoke the provisions at any time, even during a pending civil trial.
Such seems to be the case in the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, a
French national charged with terrorist activities awaiting trial in a federal court in the state of Virginia. The trial judge recently sanctioned the
prosecutors, telling them that they could not seek the death penalty if
they continued to refuse Moussaoui access to key witnesses who might
provide exculpatory evidence on his behalf, but who are being held in
secret detention and interrogation facilities by the government. The government is considering transfering the case to a military commission as
one viable option for the completion of the proceedings.
Any detainee designated as an illegal combatant, whether citizen or
non-citizen, but who is not tried by military commission, faces an even
more daunting fate. They will remain prisoners until they are released by
the military without trial or until the end of the war on terrorism, a seemingly endless prospect.

THE DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY:
TWO YEARS WITHOUT REDRESS
STARTING TWO YEARS AGO in November 2001, the United States
De p a rtment of Defense began to detain foreign nationals without
charges or trial at Camp Delta, a prison that is part of a larger U.S. mili t a ry installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although names and
nationalities are not published by the military, it is believed that the
detainees now total around 650, some of whom are known to be children, and that they come from more than 40 countries around the world,
not just Afghanistan. The U.S. military has potential space for up to
1,000 detainees and a 10-year operating budget. Press re p o rts indicate
that detainees we re moved into Camp Delta as recently as Ma rch 2003:
with transfers there from other countries such as Bosnia and Gambia.
Although some detainees have been released, the number of detainees
remains approximately the same. As of July 2003, there had been at least
29 suicide attempts by 18 individuals held in the detention facility.
All of the Guantanamo detainees have been effectively denied the
protection of the Ge n e va Conventions, which govern the treatment of
prisoners of war. No Guantanamo detainee has yet been brought before
a competent tribunal to determine his status as soldier or civilian as
required by the Geneva Conventions. None of the Guantanamo
detainees has had access to any court or legal counsel, and family members have not been permitted to visit them in Cuba. The need for a judicial determination of status is made all the more urgent by ongoing transfers into the facility from locations other than Afghanistan, which rebut
the government’s assertion that all the prisoners are “battlefield”
detainees. The detainees face two equally odious realities: Some will be
chosen by the president for trial by military commission while others will
be kept in indefinite detention.
In July 2003, the Defense Department issued a comprehensive and
final set of procedures for the military commissions, and pursuant to

LESSONS FROM TURKEY:
THE FAILED TRIAL OF ABDULLAH ÖCALAN
IN MARCH 2003, the Eu ropean Court of Human Rights decided the
case of Abdullah Öcalan, former leader of the Kurdish Worker’s Pa rt y
(PKK). The PKK supported independence for Kurdish communities in
Tu rkey and Iraq. The party was outlawed in Tu rkey and is included on
the U.S. State Department’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations. Öcalan became the leader of the PKK during the mid-1980s and
operated from a safe haven in neighboring Syria. The PKK army carried
out more than 6,000 attacks in Turkey alone, leaving a total of 30,000
dead rebels, soldiers, and civilians. In 1999, when the Turkish gove r nment threatened to invade Syria if it continued to protect him, Öcalan
moved through several countries before ending up in Nairobi, Kenya,
where he was captured and forcibly returned to Turkey by the security
police without any judicial process. On the day of his arrest in Kenya,
there were riots, both pro and con, in the streets of Turkey and other
countries in Europe.
Back in Turkey, Öcalan was immediately transported to the tiny,
uninhabited island of Imrali, in the Sea of Marmara, where he was the
sole inmate in a facility where his trial was to be held under State Security
C o u rtprocedures. The three-judge panel that initially heard his case was
made up of one military officer and two civilians, but the military judge
was removed and replaced by a civilian judge during the trial. The
replacement required a special act of the Tu rkish National Assembly,
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taken in the face of international criticism that Öcalan could not receive
a fair trial before a court with strong military influence. His lawyers we re
g i ven only limited access to their client before the trial, the number of
l a w yers permitted to visit him was limited, and all conversations between
them and their client were monitored by government officials.
In June 1999, Öcalan was convicted of training and leading a gang
of armed terrorists in carrying out acts designed to bring about the secession of a southwest territory in Turkey, and he was sentenced to death.
On the day of his sentencing, families of his victims in attendance at the
c o u rt proceedings spontaneously broke into singing the Turkish national anthem. Despite domestic appeals and a commutation of the death
sentence by the Turkish National Assembly, again in the face of European
pressure, Öcalan’s conviction was upheld. He then filed a petition for
human rights violations with the European Court of Human Rights
(European Court).
The decision of the
Eu ropean Court in Öcalan v.
Turkey was critical of the domestic proceedings in four key
respects that relate to the proposed military commission trials
in Guantanamo. First, the government defended the independence of the State Security Court
because the military judge was
removed from the proceedings
and the judgment of the panel
was made by an all-civilian court .
Howe ve r, in keeping with the
extremely restrictive view of the
role of military tribunals, the
Eu ropean Court found that “the
last-minute replacement of the Abdullah Ocalan at trial in Turkey.
Credit: courtesy of International
military judge was not capable of Initiative of Freedom for Ocalan
curing the defect in the composition of the court . ”
Second, the European Court condemned the Tu rkish government
for its delays in the adjudicative processes afforded to the accused. The
Eu ropean Court found that a delay of seven days from Öcalan’s return to
Turkey before being presented before a judge violated the requirement
under international human rights law that an answer be brought
“promptly” before a judge. Similarly, Tu rkey violated Öcalan’s right to a
speedy remedy to determine the lawfulness of his detention when he was
kept incommunicado for ten days from his lawyers, and how he “could
not reasonably be expected under such conditions to be able to challenge
the lawfulness and length of his detention without the assistance of his
lawyer.”
Third, the European Court found that Turkey had seriously interfered with Öcalan’s right to prepare and conduct a defense, where there
were lengthy denials of access to defense counsel, where the length and
time of meetings with counsel was severely restricted, and where all confidential conversations between counsel and client were re q u i red to be
conducted within the sight and hearing of prison officers, which the government defended as necessary “to ensure the applicant’s security.”
Fourth, despite the amendment of Tu rkish domestic law to bar the
death penalty against Öcalan, the European Court went to great lengths
to note that the imposition of the death penalty at the conclusion of an
unfair trial constituted inhuman treatment in itself and thus a violation
of his human rights.

ABIMAEL GUZMAN BECAME THE INTELLECTUAL and military leader
of the Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining Path”, guerrilla movement in Pe ru
in the late 1960s. The group, inspired by Marxist and Maoist ideologies,
began armed actions in 1980 under the slogan “Elections no; People’s
War yes.” Between 1980 and 1990, Guzman and the Shining Path carried out over 120,000 attacks throughout Pe ru, leaving 19,000 dead,
including some 10,000 innocent civilians. In fact, the recent truth commission re p o rt in Pe ru notes that the number of deaths caused by the
insurgents exceeded those caused by military and police forces.
A l b e rto Fujimori, president of Peru at the time of Guzman’s arrest
in 1992, made decisive and aggressive military and legal action against
the Shining Path a hallmark of his administration. Fujimori bent the law
to his will and temporarily became a national hero for his decisive actions
in the name of national security. He later fled the country to avoid arrest
in the midst of growing re velations of scandal and corruption in the highest ranks of his administration.
Guzman was arrested, tried and sentenced during September and
October of 1992. Be f o re his trial, he was kept on prominent public display, donning a striped suit in an open cage, and the prison where he was
held maintained extreme measures of security. He was tried and sentenced by a special military court dealing with terrorist crimes to life
imprisonment. President Fujimori personally decreed that the sentence
be served in the total darkness of an underground cell so that Guzman
would never see the light of day again in his lifetime.
After Guzman’s trial, Fujimori called for the re-adoption and
retroactive application of the death penalty, abolished in the 1979 constitution. Fujimori asserted that nine out of ten Peruvians called for
Guzman’s death and announced that he was prepared to withdraw fro m
the most basic Inter-American human rights treaty, which forbids re i nstitution of the death penalty by those countries that have abolished it, to
appease the people of his country. The Fujimori administration took
active steps in that direction throughout the 1990s.
The path of judicial re v i ew for Guzman was a long and complex
one, not nearly as direct as that taken by Öcalan in the European human
rights system. The first issue presented for international review was the
legality, under the American Convention on Human Rights (American
Convention), of the proposed amendment to the Pe ruvian Constitution
to permit the re-institution of the death penalty. That issue was resolved
against Pe ru in Ad v i s o ry Opinion OC-14/94 of the Inter-American
C o u rt of Human Rights (Inter-American Court), decided in December
1994. Article 4.3 of the American Convention explicitly prohibits the
reestablishment of the death penalty in states that have abolished it. The
case did not present the Inter-American Court with an actual controve rsy, and the name of neither Guzman nor the Shining Path was on the
court’s docket, but it made clear in its conclusions that “promulgation of
a law in manifest conflict with the obligations assumed by a state upon
ratifying or adhering to the [American] Convention is a violation of that
treaty.” Pe ru could not readopt the death penalty without violating international law, and Guzman could never be sentenced to death.
It was not the advisory opinion, however, that led the Pe ruvian government under President Fujimori to attempt to withdraw from the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court in 1999. That action came in
the wake of a series of decisions by the Inter-American Court that were
highly critical of the Special Military Court, a tribunal created to deal
with terrorists through summary trials before so-called “faceless,” or
unidentifiable, military judges, without judicial re v i ew or other safeguards. The two decisions of Loayza Tamayo v. Pe ru and Castillo Petruzzi
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v. Pe ru were devastating indictments against the failed attempts by military courts to mete out justice to alleged terrorists. The Inter-American
C o u rt condemned both the specific use of “faceless” judges and military
trials in general, even in the case of alleged terrorist acts by persons “a s s ociated with insurgency groups.” The Inter-American Court noted that
military personnel cannot maintain impartiality in judging those who are
its enemies in the field. Moreover, because superior military officerd
decided appointments to the military court as well as the promotion in
rank of judges, the Inter-Americn Court called into question the independence of thees judges.

played key roles in the decision-making. The Guantanamo military commissions will be staffed by three to seven military officers, and both the
chief prosecutor and chief defense counsel are also military lawyers.
Moreover, the only appeal from their decisions is within the De p a rtment
of Defense and to the president, and access is not permitted to the civilian justice system on appeal from judgments of the commissions. The
respective decisions in Öcalan and Guzman both criticized the lack of
effective access and re v i ew by civilian courts.
Detainees in Guantanamo have experienced delays in access to
the courts of up to two years in some cases. In the Öcalan proceedings,
periods of seven and ten days without access to the courts or counsel
were deemed exc e s s i ve under relevant human rights norms. The rules
for defense counsel at the Guantanamo military commissions also
include provisions similar to those faced by the lawyers for Öcalan and
Guzman. They include a requirement that civilian defense counsel sign
an affidavit, which permits open monitoring of confidential attorneyclient conversations by government officials “for security and intelligence purposes.”
In both the Turkey and Peru cases, international tribunals found that
domestic justice had failed these two individuals and hundreds of others
condemned through the same processes, and new trials were required.

CONCLUSION
IN HIS JULY 2002 REPORT to the UN Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Louis Joinet, the Special
R a p p o rteur on the Issue of the Administration of Justice through
Mil i t a ryTribunals, wrote that “In all circumstances, the competence of
m i l i t a rytribunals should be abolished in favour of those of the ord i n a ry
courts, for trying persons responsible for serious human rights violations.”
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration), the
foundational expression of human rights principles, recognizes that not
all human rights are absolute. Article 29(2) of the Declaration permits
states to limit the exercise of human rights, provided that the sole purpose is to secure “due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others” and of meeting “the just requirements of . . . public order.” The
Declaration also recognizes, howe ve r, that a state cannot justify its limitation on human rights if its actions are “aimed at the destruction of any
of the rights and freedoms” proclaimed in the Declaration. The “public
order” justifications offered by the United States government for its proposed use of military commissions, as well as its potentially indefinite
confinement of the Guantanamo detainees, have destroyed all human
rights protections for the detainees.
The United States, with one of the strongest and most respected
criminal justice systems in the world, has chosen to deal with the
Guantanamo prisoners, and all others designated “illegal combatants,”
not through our much-lauded criminal processes, but in trials that will
take place totally outside our system of civilian justice. If brought to trial
before military commissions designed in the heat of a post-September 11
passion for vengeance, there is every reason to believe that the
Guantanamo detainees will be subject to the same criticisms as the court s
that convicted Ocalan and Guzman. Because the United States refuses to
submit to the jurisdiction of international human rights bodies, it is up
to the domestic courts of the United States to take a firm stand against
abuses by the exe c u t i ve branch. They are the last legal hope for the
detainees, whether they face trial by military commission or indefinite
incommunicado detention. H R B

Protest over trial of Ocalan.
Credit: courtesy of In t e rnational Initiative of Freedom for Ocalan

The other violations found by the Inter-American Court in Castillo
Petruzzi set out a catalog of the shortcomings of military commissions:
the offenses for which the alleged terrorists could be convicted were ove rly broad, thus violating the principle of legality; the conditions of confinement we re cruel, inhuman, and degrading; confessions were coerced
through torture or other cruel and degrading treatment; the defendants
did not have the time and facilities to meet with defense counsel to prepare an adequate defense; the rules of evidence did not permit fair participation of the defense during trial; and there was no right to appeal to
civilian court s .
Pe ru eventually returned to the fold of the inter-American human
rights system under the presidency of Alejandro Toledo. In January of
this year, in what is called one of its most significant decisions, the
Constitutional Court of Peru decided Marcelino Tineo Silva et. al., a case
brought by more than 5,000 citizens who sought the review and unconstitutionality of the terrorism and military court decrees issued by the
executive branch during the Fujimori years. The Constitutional Court ,
following the roadmap laid out for it by the Inter-American Court ,
s t ruck down all the anti-terrorist decrees and ordered the retrial of
Guzman and an estimated 2,000 other persons convicted during those
years. In late July 2003, the government prosecutor recommended to a
civilian court a sentence of 20 years for Guzman for his alleged involvement in the May 1991 terrorist attacks in the capital city of Lima.

THE ILLEGITIMACY OF TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION
FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
WHILE COMPARING THE SEVERITY OF TERRORIST actions is difficult
to measure, the attacks orchestrated by Öcalan and Guzman seem every
bit as vicious and destru c t i ve as those of the Al Qaeda network to date.
The cases in Turkey and Pe ru against these two notorious terrorists are
analogous in many ways to the U.S. government’s proposed trials by mili t a rycommission of the Guantanamo detainees.
In both the Öcalan and Guzman proceedings, military judges
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